(1965) LCER-340(SC) #

Case Summary #

This appeal borders on Civil Procedure

Brief Facts: #

This appeal stems from the judgment of the High Court of Lagos. The plaintiffs’/respondents’ claim against the defendants/appellants amounted to 1,500 pounds, comprising special and general damages. The claim arose from the delivery of goods to the defendants at their port in Lagos around October 26, 1961. The defendants were paid the customary fee to take care of and redeliver the goods to the plaintiffs. However, the defendants failed to fulfill this obligation, resulting in the loss of the goods and causing significant inconvenience and expenses to the plaintiffs.

The Statement of Claim detailed these facts, which were essentially reiterated in the Statement of Defence. While admitting the disappearance of the goods from their warehouse, the defendants denied any negligence on their part and invoked the protection provided by Section 91 of the Ports Ordinance, 1952.

At trial, evidence confirmed the disappearance of the goods from the defendants’ warehouse. However, there was no evidence regarding how the goods went missing or were removed. Nonetheless, the defendants presented clear evidence, acknowledged by one of the plaintiffs’ witnesses, demonstrating that adequate security measures were in place to safeguard the entrusted properties.

Despite this, the trial judge concluded that the defendants failed to prove they were not negligent in safeguarding the goods. Judgment was entered against them for 1,242-10s as special damages and 50 guineas as general damages, totaling 1,292-10s, with costs assessed at 60 guineas.

Dissatisfied with this ruling, the appellants appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues: #

The Court determined the issues joined by the parties.

Ratio Decidendi #

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE – Literal Rule of Interpretation – Approach of Court in interpreting the clear and unambiguous words of a statute #

“In the Bonnington case, supra, it was held in effect that the plain words of the statute had deliberately shifted the onus probandi from the defendants to the plaintiffs. In other words, the statute must be given its plain meaning and not be construed, unless there be justification for such a course, as being merely declaratory of the common law. We point out that in the construction of a statute, it is necessary that the words used by the statute should be considered and that the construction should not be based on any assumptions that the statute is merely declaratory of a particular state of things or any existing law. Lord Herschell observed in the case of Bank of England v. Vagliano Bros. [1891] A.C. 107 at p. 145: “If a statute, intended to embody in a code a particular branch of the law, is to be treated in this fashion, it appears to me that its utility will be almost entirely destroyed, and the very object with which it was enacted will be frustrated. The purpose of such a statute surely was that on any point specifically dealt with by it, the law should be ascertained by interpreting the language used instead of, as before, by roaming over a vast number of authorities in order to discover what the law was, extracting it by a minute critical examination of the prior decisions, dependant upon a knowledge of the exact effect even of an obsolete proceeding such as a demurrer to evidence … What, however, I am venturing to insist upon is, that the first step taken should be to interpret the language of the statute, and that an appeal to earlier decisions can only be justified on some special grounds.” Per GEORGE BAPTIST AYODOLA COKER, JSC in N.P.A. V. AKAR & SONS (1965) LCER-340(SC) (Pp 7 – 9, Paras D – A)

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE – Section 91(A) and (B) Of the Ports Act – Interpretation of Section 91(a) and (b) of the Ports Act #

“We are of the view that on the plain meaning of Section 91(a) and (b) the onus is upon the plaintiffs in order to deprive the defendants of the protection afforded them by Section 91 to establish want of reasonable foresight and care on the part of the Nigerian Ports Authority or its servants, and that inasmuch as the trial judge held that that onus was on the defendants to prove the contrary, he was in error of law and misdirected himself.” Per GEORGE BAPTIST AYODOLA COKER, JSC in N.P.A. V. AKAR & SONS (1965) LCER-340(SC) (P. 9, Paras A – C)

Decision/Held: #

On the whole, the appeal was allowed. The judgement of the High Court of Lagos was set aside.