“In the Bonnington case, supra, it was held in effect that the plain words of the statute had deliberately shifted the onus probandi from the defendants to the plaintiffs. In other words, the statute must be given its plain meaning and not be construed, unless there be justification for such a course, as being merely declaratory of the common law. We point out that in the construction of a statute, it is necessary that the words used by the statute should be considered and that the construction should not be based on any assumptions that the statute is merely declaratory of a particular state of things or any existing law. Lord Herschell observed in the case of Bank of England v. Vagliano Bros. [1891] A.C. 107 at p. 145: “If a statute, intended to embody in a code a particular branch of the law, is to be treated in this fashion, it appears to me that its utility will be almost entirely destroyed, and the very object with which it was enacted will be frustrated. The purpose of such a statute surely was that on any point specifically dealt with by it, the law should be ascertained by interpreting the language used instead of, as before, by roaming over a vast number of authorities in order to discover what the law was, extracting it by a minute critical examination of the prior decisions, dependant upon a knowledge of the exact effect even of an obsolete proceeding such as a demurrer to evidence … What, however, I am venturing to insist upon is, that the first step taken should be to interpret the language of the statute, and that an appeal to earlier decisions can only be justified on some special grounds.”

Per GEORGE BAPTIST AYODOLA COKER, JSC in N.P.A. V. AKAR & SONS (1965) LCER-340(SC) (Pp 7 – 9, Paras D – A) #