“Although it is not suggested that there was a contract to grant a delay of two months, that external approach ought also to be applied in promissory estoppel, which is the allegation here; we accept that there was a promise, and proceed to consider the case in that light. There is the Privy Council decision in Ajayi v. R. T. Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1326 (an appeal from the Supreme Court, whose judgment is reported in [1962] 1 All N.L.R. 673). The Privy Council said as follows (at p.1330): “Their Lordships are of opinion that the principle of law as defined by Bowen L. J. has been confirmed by the House of Lords in the case of Tool Metal Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Tungsten Electric Co. Ltd. where the authorities were reviewed and no encouragement was given to the view that the principle was capable of extension so as to create rights in the promisee for which he had given no consideration. The principle, which has been described as quasi estoppel and perhaps more aptly as promissory estoppel, is that when one party to a contract in the absence of fresh consideration agrees not to enforce his rights an equity will be raised in favour of the other party. This equity is, however, subject to the qualifications (1) that the other party has altered his position, (2) that the promisor can resile from his promise on giving reasonable notice, which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position, (3) the promise only becomes final and irrevocable if the promisee cannot resume his position.”(The passage will be found at 559 of the report of the case in [1964] 3 All E.R. 556. For Tool Metal Manufacturing Co. Ltd. see [1955] 1 W.L.R. 76; [1955] 2 All E.R. 657. For Bowen L. J. see Birmingham and District Land Co. v. London and North Western Railway Co. (1888) 40 Ch.D. 268, 286). Thus the first question is whether the defendant altered his position. His learned counsel said that he did not pay and laid himself open to the liability of seizure of the tippers; that was the light in which the defendant must be regarded as having altered his position. The argument is not convincing. Before the talk in mid-August he had not paid and the tippers were liable to seizure; at mid-August the liability to seizure was suspended; at the end of August the company wrote telling him that he must pay by the 6th September. Thus the suspension was withdrawn and the liability to seizure revived: that is to say, his position was again what it had been before mid-August; so then, what was it that he himself did after mid-August to alter his position so that he should need an opportunity of resuming his former position? It is not suggested that he did anything on the faith of the suspension. He had not the money to pay the arrears he owed before mid-August, and he had it not afterwards. His case is merely this: he had been promised an indulgence, he expected it not to be withdrawn, and he complains that he was disappointed in his expectation. Learned counsel did not explain in what way this case differed from Ajayi v. R. T. Briscoe (Nigeria) Ltd. (supra) in the application of the principles stated by the Privy Council. We do not think the defendant has a valid ground of complaint in equity, and his appeal must be dismissed.”
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