“The principles on which an Appeal Court acts when it is called upon to decide on the quantum of damages are well established and clearly stated by Greer, L.J. in Flint v. Lovell [1935] 1 K.B. 354 at page 360. These principles were considered by the Privy Council in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Company Limited [1951] A.C. 601, where at page 613 Viscount Simon observed as follows-“The principles which apply under this head are not in doubt. Whether the assessment of damages be by a judge or a jury, the appellate Court is not justified in substituting a figure of its own for that awarded below simply because it would have awarded a different figure if it had tried the case at first instance. Even if the tribunal of first instance was a judge sitting alone, then, before the appellate Court can properly intervene, it must be satisfied either that the judge, in assessing the damages, applied a wrong principle of law (as by taking into account some irrelevant factor or leaving out of account some relevant one) ; or, short of this, that the amount awarded is either so inordinately low or so inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage (Flint v. Lovell approved by the House of Lords in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Colliery, Ltd.[1942] A.C. 601). These principles were applied by this Court in the recent case of Agaba v. Otubusin [1961] 1 All N.L.R. 299, where total damages of 3,830 awarded by a High Court to the plaintiff were reduced to 2,000.”

Per GEORGE BAPTIST AYODOLA COKER, JSC in JARMAKANI TRANSPORT LTD V. ABEKE (1963) LCER-237(SC) (Pp 8 – 10 Paras E – C)