COURT – DUTY OF COURT – Whether a Court of law has the legal duty to confine itself only to authorities cited by the parties; exception(s) thereto

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“Undoubtedly, this Court had reiterated in a plethora of authorities, that a Court of law is not obliged to restrict or confine itself only to authorities cited and relied upon by the parties. Indeed, the Court is cloaked with an unfettered discretionary power to enrich the quality of its decision, refer to and rely upon creditable authorities not envisaged by the parties in the briefs or addresses thereof. See ORUGBO VS BULARA UNA (2002) 9 SCNJ 12 @ 32-32: Historical books or whatever books are authorities and the Koko Districts Customary Court was free to make use of them in its judgment. That perse is not breach of fair hearing; not even the twin rules of natural justice. The Court is under no duty to give notice to the notice to the parties that it intends to use a particular book. That will be a ridiculous situation. Most interestingly, however, there is a caveat to the above dictum! In my considered view, citing a book is one thing, but attaching weight to the views expressed therein in the course of the decision or judgment is an entirely different ball-game. As aptly admonished by this Court four and a half decades ago: The Courts are not to be hypnotised by the authority of print. The crucial fact is that a book cannot be cross-examined, either as to the opinion expressed, or as to the author to have special knowledge. If the author is living, there is no reason why he should not be tendered as an expert witness, when this difficulty would vanish. See IDUNDUN VS. OKUMAGBA (1976) LPELR – 1431 (SC) Per Fatayi-Williams, JSC (as the learned lord then was quoting Lionel Brett, JSC) @ 23 paragraphs A – E. In the instant case, there is undoubtedly nothing wrong, unusual or prejudicial about the trial Court suo motu resorting to the provisions of Sections 270 and 287 of the 1999 Constitution (Supra) in the course of the judgment. Most particularly, Section 270 of the Constitution merely deals with the establishment of the High Court of a State of the Federation, thereby providing that – 270. (1) There shall be a High Court for each of the Federation. (2) The High Court of a State shall consist of- (a) a Chief Judge of the State; and (b) such number of Judges of the High Court as may be prescribed by a law of the House of Assembly of the state. On the other hand, Section 287 of the 1999 Constitution (Supra) merely deals with enforcement of decisions of Courts of record, to the following effect: 287. (1) The decisions of the Supreme Court shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons and by Courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Supreme Court. (2) The decisions of the Court of Appeal shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by Courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Court of Appeal. (3) The decisions of the Federal High Court, a High Court and all of other Courts established by this Constitution shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by other Courts of Law with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Federal High Court, the National Industrial Court, a High Court and those other Courts, respectively. Thus, contrary to the misconceived Appellant’s proposition, the trial Court and indeed every Court of law in this Court, is endowed with far-reaching unfettered discretionary power to cite, or allude to enactments, books et al it deems appropriate or expedient in the course of the decision or judgment thereof.” Per IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, JSC in ADEGBANKE v. OJELABI & ORS (2021-LCER-40456-SC) (Pp 54 – 57 Paras F – G)

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