EVIDENCE – PRESUMPTION OF LAW – Presumption of law that any person born during the continuance of a valid marriage shall be presumed to be a child of that man; burden and standard of proof required to dislodge same

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“…To my mind, the main issue in this appeal is to determine the paternity of the respondent. I am therefore of the considered view that issue 4 nominated by the appellant would sufficiently resolve this appeal, to wit:- “Whether the learned justice of the Court of Appeal were right in holding that the presumption of legitimacy inures to the benefit of the respondent.” In answering the above questions, the law is trite that any person born during the continuance of a valid marriage shall be presumed to be a child of that man. The burden of proving otherwise rests with the party alleging the contrary. See Ukeje v. Ukeje (2014) All FWLR (Pt. 730) 1323, (2014) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1418) 384, (2014) LPELR – 22724 SC. It is instructive to note that under our law, evidence to dislodge paternity as in the instant case requires prove beyond reasonable doubt. The brief fact of the case is that after the death and burial of Pa Egharevba Idahosa, the respondent took possession of the late father’s Igiogbe at No. 15 Ogbelaka Street, Benin City. The appellant who is the respondent’s younger brother contended that the respondent is the biological son of one Pa Osayande who testified as DW2. The appellant contends that shortly before the death of their mother, Madam Onaiwu, she confessed to himself and the respondent that at the time wherein she was separated from late Pa. Egharevba Idahosa, she took in for Pa Osayande and gave birth to the respondent and PW2, Mrs. Comfort Ekwebelem. The matter was reported to the Oba’s Palace for resolution but before the Oba could come out with a final verdict; the respondent commenced this action claiming inter alia: “a declaration that he is his late father’s eldest son.” Under cross-examination at the trial Court, the respondent (as plaintiff) debunked the appellant’s story that late Madam Onaiwu confessed to both of them before she died. It is his testimony that the appellant was not even in Benin on the date the alleged confession was made. Now, the question on my mind is this: on the day the appellant heard such heavy confession from late Madam Onaiwu, why didn’t he raise alarm to invite witnesses? It is now his word against that of the respondent and the Court cannot successfully pick and choose which testimony to believe. Such evidence is now at best an hearsay evidence and no Court can safely rely on it. See Doma v. I.N.E.C. (2012) All FWLR (Pt. 628) 815, (2012) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1317) 297, (2012) LPELR 7822; Are v. Adisa (1967) NMLR 304 at 306; Subramanian v. Public Prosecutor (1965) 1 WLR 963 at 969. I have stated elsewhere in this judgment that under Section 165 of the Evidence Act, any person born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within 280 days after dissolution of the marriage, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be presumed to be a child of the main. In the instant case, the parent to the respondent were married until death in 1977 and 1997 respectively. There is no evidence of dissolution of their marriage before death. I cannot therefore find any evidence to dislodge the respondent’s paternity under our law. May I also state that our world today has shifted significantly to science and scientific analogies. I wonder why parties in this appeal never considered subjecting themselves to a medical test, to wit: a DNA test, to ascertain the paternity of parties rather then resort to litigation which has lasted this length of time. For all I have said above, I hold that the Court below was right to hold that the presumption of legitimacy inures to the benefit of the respondent.” per OKORO, J.S.C. in SGT. STEPHEN IDAHOSA v. CHRISTOPHER IDAHOSA (2020-LCER-39164-SC) at p. 22 – p. 25

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