“As rightly held by the Court below, the freedom of expression and freedom to hold opinions are rights accruing to Nigerian citizens. Section 39(1) of the 1999 Constitution as amended provides: – “Every person shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference.” It is also correct as submitted by learned counsel to the Appellant, that Section 39(3) of the Constitution does not diminish the rights in Section 39(1) of the Constitution. However, Section 45(1) of the Constitution is very clear in its limitations. It states thus “Nothing in Sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of the Constitution shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society, in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health or for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons.” What the above means is that Section 39 of the 1999 Constitution as amended, which is relevant for our purposes here, cannot operate, to invalidate any law promulgated by any legislative body, when that law is made in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health or for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons. So when Section 39(1) of the Constitution entitles a person to freedom of expression and imparting ideas and information, it is not a blanket right. It must not be utilised or invoked in such a way, that it offends public safety, order, morality and health, and it must not be injurious to the rights and freedom of other persons. Once a person lives in a community, his rights stop where the rights of the other members of the community begin. He has to behave according to the norms of that society, otherwise his conduct will be injurious to the wellbeing and continued existence of that community. He cannot, in the guise of exercising his freedom of expression or imparting information, trample upon the rights of other persons in the society. He must not act in such a way that he defames their character or endanger their safety, health, order or morality. The Constitution recognizes the fact that if such a person acts to the detriment of others, he can be liable in a civil action, but the issue goes beyond the right of an injured individual to act. The whole society has to be involved to protect itself. Hence, criminalising such conduct of the individual. That is why Section 45(1) of the Constitution was promulgated. The FIR filed against the Appellant is in respect of the offences of defamation of character, injurious falsehood, printing or engraving such matter. These are offences that are against public morality, health and order of the society. The offences, if proved, would have injured the rights and well-being of the Appellant to his character and reputation. They are therefore within the ambit of Section 45(1) of the 1999 Constitution. So, the said offences alleged against the Appellant in the FIR, as contained in the Penal Code, are not unconstitutional, and have not constituted a flagrant violation and subjugation by criminal process, of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression upon which the Appellant was proceeded against was constitutional and opinion of the Appellant. Endorsing the above adumbrated decision of the Court below, my learned brother in his lead judgment, opined thus: “The right to freedom of expression expressed by Section 39 of the Constitution… Section 45(1)(b) subject to any law reasonably justified in a democratic society for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons. Although Section 45 of the Constitution generally allows derogation from fundamental rights guarantees contained in Sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41, derogations must be legal, that is, made under a law that is reasonably justified in a democratic society in the interest of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health and for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of others…”I agree entirely with this reasoning of my learned brother and adopt same as mine.” Per ABOKI, JSC in AVIOMOH v. C.O.P & ANOR (2021-LCER-40461-SC) (Pp 41 – 45 Paras F – C).