ALIYU V. NAMADI & 2 ORS

(2023-LCER-48013-SC)

IN THE SUPRAME COURT OF NIGERIA

HOLDEN AT ABUJA

ON FRIDAY THE 13^TH DAY OF JANUARY 2023

BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS

KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT

UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI —————– JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT

MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA —————– JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT

IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA —————– JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT

ADAMU JAURO —————– JUSTICE. SUPREME COURT

SC/CV/1453/2022

BETWEEN

HON. FAROUK ADAMU ALIYU

APPELLANT

AND

1. UMARA NAMADI

2. ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS (APC)

3. INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL

COMMISSION (INEC)

RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT (DELIVERED BY KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN, JSC) The appellant herein was a participant in the primary election of the 2^ndrespondent conducted on 26^th May 2022 to select its gubernatorial candidate for Jigawa State in the upcoming 2023 General Elections. The party

adopted the indirect method in making the selection as provided for in Section 84(1), (2) and (5) of the Electoral Act 2022. The 1^st respondent was declared the winner, having scored 1,220 votes while the appellant came 3^rd with 13 votes. Being dissatisfied with the outcome of the primary, the appellant instituted an action before the Federal High Court, Dutse, Jigawa State on 8/6/2022 for the determination of the following

questions:

1. Having regards to the flagrant breach of the provisions of Section 84(5) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Electoral Act 2022 INECS Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Political Party Primaries, Article 20.4 (ii)) (b) of the Constitution of the All Progressives Congress Articles 22(iii) 25 and 26 of the Al Progressives Congress Guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for the 2023 General Elections read together with The All Progressives Congress Notice of Conduct of Special Congress issued by the All Progressives Congress National Organizing Secretary whether the Defendant was validly nominated on the 27^th May 2022 as the candidate of the 2^nd Defendant in the forthcoming 2023 Gubernatorial Election in Jigawa State.

2. Whether the purported nomination of the 1^st Defendant on the 27^th May 2022 as the Candidate of the 2^nd Defendant for the forthcoming 2023 Gubernatorial Election in Jigawa State is not invalid, wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional same having being in total contravention of the provisions of Section 845(60 and (i) of the Electoral Act 2022, INEC’s Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Political Party Primaries,

Article 20.4(i)(b) of the Constitution of the All Progressives Congress, Articles 22(iii), 25 and 26 of the All Progressives Congress Guidelines for the nomination of Candidates for the 2023 General Elections and All Progressives Congress Notice of Conduct of Special Congress issued by the All Progressives Congress National Organizing Secretary?

3, Having regards to the provisions of Section 84(13) of the Electoral Act 2022, whether the 3^rd Defendant is not obligated to refuse to accept the purported nomination of the 1^st Defendant as the candidate of the 2^nd Defendant for the forthcoming Gubernatorial 2023 Election in Jigawa State, the 1^st Defendant’s purported nomination on the 27^th May, 2022, having being in flagrant violation and in contravention of the provisions of Section 84(5) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Electoral Act, 2022, INEC’s Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Political Party Primaries, Article 20.4 (i) (b) of the Constitution of the All Progressives Congress, Articles 22(iii), 25 and 26 of The All Progressives Congress Guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for the 2023 General Elections, read together with the All Progressives Congress Notice of Conduct of Special Congress issued by the All Progressives Congress National Organizing Secretary regulating the nomination of the Jigawa State Gubernatorial Candidate of the 2^nd Defendant which was purportedly held on 27 May, 2022 at Aminu Kano Triangle, Dutse, Jigawa State?

In the event that the questions were answered in his favour, he sought the following

Reliefs:

1. A Declaration that by virtue of the Provisions of Section 84(5) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Electoral Act, 2022, INEC’s “Regulations and Guidelines tor the Conduct

of Political Party Primaries, “Article,20.4(ii) (b) of the Constitution of the All Progressives Congress Articles 22(ii), 25 and 26 of the All Progressives Congress Guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for the 2023 General Elections, read together with the All Progressives Congress’ Notice of Conduct of Special Congress issued by the All Progressives Congress National Organizing Secretary for the purpose of regulating the Gubernatorial Primary Election which was purportedly held on 27^th May, 2022 at Aminu Kano Triangle, Dutse, Jigawa State, the 1^st Defendant is not validly nominated candidate of the 2^nd Defendant in the forthcoming 2023 Gubernatorial Election in Jigawa State.

2. A Declaration that by virtue of Section 84(13) of the Electoral Act 2022, the 3^rd Defendant is obligated to reject the nomination of the 1^st Defendant as candidate of 2^nd Defendant in the forthcoming 2023 Gubernatorial Election because the purported nomination of the 1st defendant was done in flagrant breach of the provisions of Section 84(5) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Electoral Act, 2022, INECs Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Political Party Primaries, Article 20.4 (ii) (b) of the Constitution of the All Progressives Congress, Articles 22 (iii), 25 and 26 of the All Progressives Congress Guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for the 2023; General Elections, read together with the, All Progressives Congress Notice of Conduct of Special Congress issued by the All Progressives Congress National Organizing Secretary for the purpose of regulating the Gubernatorial Primary Election which was purportedly held on 27h May, 2022 at Aminu Kano Triangle, Dutse Jigawa State.

Consequent upon grant of any of the above:

1. An Order of this Honourable Court setting aside the declaration of the 1^st Defendant as the winner of the Gubernatorial Primaries of the 2^nd Defendant, which was purportedly held on 27^th May 2022 at Aminu Kano Triangle, Dutse, Jigawa State.

2. An Order of Perpetual Injunction of this Honourable Court restraining the Defendant from parading himself as the winner of the 2d Defendant’s Gubernatorial Primary Election purportedly held on the 27^th day of May 2022, at Aminu Kano Triangle, Dutse Jigawa State for the forthcoming 2023 General Election in Jigawa State.

3. An Order of Perpetual Injunction of this Honourable Court restraining the 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants from recognizing and holding out the 1^st Defendant, as the 2^nd Defendant’s flag bearer and Gubernatorial Candidate for the forthcoming General Election in Jigawa State

4. An Order of Mandatory Injunction compelling the 3^rd Defendant to delist the names of 1^st and 2^nd Defendants from amongst the list of Political Parties and Gubernatorial candidates for the forthcoming 2023 Gubernatorial Flection in Jigawa State or at any subsequent postponement or recognize the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants as political party and candidate respectively and deny them all rights and privileges due to political parties fielding candidates at the said 2023 Jigawa State gubernatorial election.

5. A Declaration that the Plaintiff is entitled to the refund of the sum of Fifty Million Naira (N50,000, 000) only being the cost of the

Expression of Interest Form and Nomination Form he purchased from the 2 Defendant Owing to the belief that the 2^nd Defendant will Comply with the provisions of Section 84(5) (b) (i)and (ii) of the Electoral Act, 2022, INEC “Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Political Party Primaries,” Article 20.4(ii) (b) of the Constitution of the All Progressives Congress Articles 22(iii), 25 and 26 of the All Progressives Congress Guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for the 2023 General Elections, read together with the All Progressives Congress Notice of Conduct of Special Congress issued by the All Progressives Congress National Organizing Secretary for the purpose of regulating the 2^nd Defendant’s Gubernatorial Primary Election in Jigawa State.

6 An Order of this Honourable Court directing the 2^nd Defendant to pay the Plaintiff the sum of Five Hundred Million Naira (N500,000, 000) only as exemplary damages for causing the Plaintiff unnecessary hardship waste of time and resources in preparing to participate at the Gubernatorial Primary Election of the 2^nd Defendant in Jigawa State Which the 2^nd Defendant organized in breach of the provisions of Section 84(5) (b) (i) and (ii) of the Electoral Act 2022, INEC ‘”Regulations and Guidelines for the Conduct of Political Party Primaries “Article 20.4(ii) (b) of the Constitution of the All Progressives Congress Articles 22 (iii), 25 and 26 of the Al Progressives Congress Guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for the 2023 General Elections, read together with the All Progressives Congress Notice of Conduct of Special Congress issued by the All Progressives Congress’ National Organizing Secretary for the

purpose of regulating the APC Gubernatorial Primary Election.

7. An Order of this Honourable Court directing the 2^nd Defendant to pay the Plaintiff the sum of Fifty Million Naira (N50,000, 000) only being the cost of prosecuting this suit.

8. An Order of this Honourable Court directing the 2^nd Defendant to pay the Plaintiff, post Judgment interest of 10% per annum from the date of the judgment until the judgment sum is satisfied.

Upon being served with the Originating Summons, the respondents filed applications challenging the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit, principally on the ground that the appellant’s complaints relate to the emergence of 827 ward delegates at the 2^nd respondent’s congress held on 17^th May 2022 and their alleged disenfranchisement which is a pre-primary matter and not justiciable. They also challenged the locus standi of the appellant to institute the action on behalf of the said delegates who were not parties to the suit. They also filed counter affidavits in opposition to the in opposition to the Originating Summons. The appellant equally filed various affidavits in opposition to the applications challenging the court’s jurisdiction and further affidavits in response to

the counter affidavits filed. Written addresses were exchanged.

In a Considered judgment delivered on 18^th September 2022, the learned trial Judge upheld the objections of the respondents to the effect that the appellant’s case was predicated on the conduct of the special congress for the nomination of delegates for the gubernatorial election in Jigawa State and therefore not justiciable. The court also held that the appellant lacked the locus to complain on behalf of the 827 delegates. The summons was accordingly struck out.

In compliance with the admonition of this court that where a court that is not the final court makes a finding that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain a suit, it should nevertheless express its opinion on the merit of the case, in the event that it is overruled, the court considered the appellant’s case on its merits and dismissed same on the ground that the appellant failed to prove his claims.

Not surprisingly, the appellant was dissatisfied with the decision and appealed to the court below.

In a considered judgment delivered on 4/11/2022, the court below set aside the part of the judgment of the trial court wherein it held that the appellant lacked the locus standi to institute the action. It held that the issue of disenfranchisement of his alleged 827 delegates was not the only complaint made by the appellant and that in so far as he participated in the primary election and had a complaint alleging non-compliance with the provisions of the Electoral Act and the 2^nd respondent’s electoral regulations and guidelines as regards the time for conducting the Governorship primary, he had the locus to ventilate his grievance. After a careful consideration for the merit of the appeal, the court dismissed same.

The appellant is dissatisfied with the part of the judgment dismissing his appeal and has further appealed to this court vide his notice of appeal filed on 17/11/2022 containing 14 grounds of appeal.

The 1^st and 2^nd respondents are also dissatisfied with portions of the judgment and consequently filed their respective notices of Cross-appeal on 17/11/2022. Both

cross appellants are dissatisfied with the finding of the lower court that the appellant had the requisite locus standi to institute the suit. The 1^st respondent/cross appellant also contends that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appellant/1^st cross respondent’s appeal having arisen from an action which the court had found to be improperly constituted by Originating Summons.

The parties duly filed and exchanged their respective briefs of argument in respect of the substantive appeal and the two cross appeals.

MAIN APPEAL

In respect of the main appeal, Dr. Onyechi Ikpeazu, SAN adopted and relied on the following processes in urging the court to allow the appeal: the appellant’s brief filed on 15/12/22 and Reply brief filed on 9/01/23. Prince L.O. Fagbemi, SAN adopted and relied on the 1^st Respondent’s brief filed on 6/01/2023 in urging the court to dismiss the appeal. T.R. Agbanyi Esq, argued appeal on behalf of the 2^nd respondent and adopted and

relied on 2nd respondent’s brief in urging the court to dismiss the appeal. Sarafa Yusuf Esq. conducted the appeal on behalf of the 3^rd respondent and adopted and relied on the 3rd respondent’s brief filed on 29/12/22 in urging the court to dismiss the appeal.

Issues

The issues distilled for the determination of the main appeal by the appellant are as follows:

1. Whether the lower WAS NOT WRONG in holding that the Appellant did not prove the complaint of the breach of Article 26 (e) – (i) of the 2^nd Respondent’s Guidelines for Nomination of Candidates for 2023 General Election as it pertains to the issue of non compliance with the date and time of the conduct of the Gubernatorial Primary election regards being had. to the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2022 and the interpretation of these provisions and Guidelines by this Honourable Court in EMMANUEL AND NNAMDI UBA v. CHIEF DR. GEORGE MOGHALUJ AND 2 ORS (2022) LPELR 57876 (SC) APC v. MOGHALU (2022) LPELR – 56993 (CA), as well as the totality of the affidavit and documentary evidence adduced by the parties particularly, Exhibits FAA 10, FAA 36, FAA 37A, FAA 376, FAA 38, APC 5B and JIGAWA 92 (Ground 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 and 15)

2. Whether the lower court WAS NOT WRONG in dismissing the Appellant claim that those who voted at the Primary Election in issue were not

eligible delegates duly elected in line with the extant laws and Guidelines of the 2^nd and 3^rd Respondents, regard being had to Section 84 (9) of the Electoral Act, 2022, the 2^nd Respondent’s Notice for the conduct of the Special Ward Congresses (Exhibit FAA5), affidavit and documentary evidence, particularly, Exhibit FAA8 (1-246) and Exhibit MDA 1 – MDA, 16 among others? (Grounds 11, 12 1nd 13)

Learned Senior Counsel for the 1st respondent/cross appellant formulated 5 issues for determination, thus:

1. Whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, particularly the materials placed before the court, which are distinguishable from the facts of APC V. MOGHALU (2022) LPELR – 57876 (SC), the court below was not right to conclude that the ward shall as used in Article 26 of the 2 Respondent’s Guidelines for Nomination of Candidates for 2023 General Election is not mandatory? (Grounds 1, 2 and 9).

2. Whether having regard to the obligations placed on the Appellant seeking declaratory reliefs, coupled with the failure to adduce credible, relevant and material evidence, court below was not right in concluding that, Appellant failed to prove the alleged non-compliance with the relevant regulations regarding the date and time for the conduct of the election being challenged, which election he fully participated in? (Grounds 3, 4, 5 and 14).

3. Whether in all the circumstances of this case, the Court below was wrong or any prejudice

occasioned, in its consideration of Exhibit ‘FAA 36’ and other allied/similar documents and in reaching its conclusion not to attach any Credibility to the said documents for being worthless and unreliable? (Grounds 6, 7 and 8).

4. Whether on the basis of the materials placed before the court, Appellant proved breach of Section 82 (1) of the Electoral Act, 2022 to make the Court below have an obligation to give effect to Section 82 (5) of the Electoral Act, 2022? (Ground 10)

5. Bearing in mind the declaratory nature of the claim of the Appellant, whether court below was wrong in holding that Appellant did not prove the existence of 827 delegates who emerged allegedly unopposed, allegedly voted for the Appellants and the further allegation that some delegates were allowed to vote without accreditation? (Ground 11, 12 and 13)

On its part, the 2^nd respondent distilled 3 issues, to wit:

1. Whether the learned Justice of the court below were right when their Lordship refused to place any probative value on Exhibit FAA36 and held that the primary election held on the 26h and 27^th of May 2022? Grounds 4, 5, 6, 78 and 14.

2. Whether the learned Justices of the court below were right when their Lordships interpreted the word “Shall” to have a discretionary meaning in the context used in Article 26 of the All-Progressives Congress (APC) guidelines for the Nomination of Candidates for 2023 General Election. Grounds 1, 2 and 3.

3. Whether the learned Justice of the court below were right when their Lordships held that the Appellant failed to proof (sic) his case and therefore not deserving of the reliefs sought by him? (Grounds 3, 10, 11, 12 and 13).

The 3^rd respondent also formulated 2 issues:

1. Whether the court below was right when it held that the Appellant failed to prove that Article 26 (e) to (i) of the APC Guidelines for Nomination of Candidates for 2023 General Elections was not complied with in the conduct of the APC Gubernatorial Primary Election in Jigawa State. (Grounds 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 and 15)

2. Whether the court below was right when it held that the Appellant did not prove his claim to warrant granting the reliefs sought in the Originating Summons. (Grounds 11, 12 and 13).

I shall adopt the appellant’s two issues for the resolution of the appeal.

ISSUE 1

Appellant’s Submissions

It was the appellant’s contention at the trial court that the 2nd respondent surreptitiously changed the date of the primary election without notice to the aspirants and

INEC thereby constituting non compliance with Article 26 (e)-(i) of the 2^nd Respondent’s Guidelines for Nomination of Candidates for 2023 election and the Electoral Act 2022. That the Governorship Primary election was fixed for 26^th May 2022 as shown in Exhibit FAA9A, Exhibit FAA 35B while pursuant to the Guidelines (Exhibit FAA6) particularly Article 29 thereof, the primary was to commence from 8am and conclude by 2pm. That by the result of the election as shown in Exhibit FAA9A and Exhibit FAA10, the election in fact held on 27^th May 2022. To further buttress this position, he referred to several other exhibits, to wit:

(i) Exhibit FAA 36 – a hand written version of 3^rd respondent’s report on the primary certified by one B.I. Wuyep, a legal practitioner and Staff in the Legal department of the 3^rd respondent.

(ii) Exhibit FAA 37B: “Summary report on the conduct of Primaries Election for the Governorship, Senate, House of Representatives and State House of Assembly by ALL PROGRESSIVES CONGRESS (APC) on 26^th, 27^th and 28^th May, 2022″

iii) Exhibit FAA 38- receipt for certification of Exhibit FAA 378

It is the appellant contention that Exhibit FAA 37B has the same content as Exhibit FAA 36 and that both have the same subject matter, that is, the APC Governorship Primaries conducted on 27th May 2022 in Jigawa State. Learned counsel refers to the opening paragraph of the report which refers to the primaries conducted on 27^th May 2022. He submitted that the conduct of the primary election on 27^th -28^th May 2022 amounts to a flagrant breach of Article 26(e) and (i) of the 2^nd respondent’s guidelines which require accreditation to be done between 8am to 12 noon and voting to commence immediately accreditation ends and continue till 2pm. He referred to the decision of this court in UBA Vs Moghalu (2022) LPELR-57876(SC) and submitted that both the trial court and the court below ought to have upheld the appellant’s contention that time for conducting the primary election was unlawfully adjusted by the primary election committee without

authorization and ought to have held that he was entitled to the relief he sought.

Learned Senior counsel also challenged the affirmation by the lower court of the finding of the learned trial Judge to the effect that the word “shall” in the context of Article 26 of the 2^nd respondent’s guidelines should not be construed as obligatory. He took particular umbrage at the view expressed by His Lordship Ugo, JCA in the lead judgment, to the effect that the provisions allow for minor concessions/adjustments where the situation calls for it, particularly considering “our ubiquitous African-man’s time way of doing things”.

Relying on Cardoso Vs Daniel (1986)2 NWLR (Pt.20) 1 (1986) LPELR -830 (SC), he submitted that once a legal position has been determined by a court of superior jurisdiction, the lower courts are bound by it. He argued that whether or not the appellant was present at the venue of the election has no bearing on the flagrant breach of the 2^nd respondent’s guidelines and cannot mitigate the infraction.

Learned counsel argued further that the lower court erred in invoking Section 124 of the Evidence Act and taking judicial notice of the National Conventions of the political parties for the purpose of selecting their presidential candidates, wherein voting commenced very late and continued through the night till the following morning, on the ground that by the said provision, parties ought to be given an opportunity to be heard. He Contended that the court raised the issue suo motu and thereby breached the appellant’s right to fair hearing. He referred to Enekwe Vs International Merchant Bank of Nig. Ltd. & Ors. (2006) LPELR-1140 (SC)

On the imperative for political parties to adhere to their own Guidelines, he referred to Uzodinma Vs Izunaso(No.2) (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt.1275) 30; APC Vs Karfi (2018) AlI FWLR (Pt.942) 328 @ 371 -372; Mato Vs Hember (2018) All FWLR (Pt.925) 146@194-197 FD; Uba Vs Moghalu (supra).

Another complaint under this issue is that the 2^nd respondent failed to give at least 21 days, notice of the

proposed conduct of the primary to the 3rd respondent as stipulated in section 82(1) of the Electoral Act. That by a letter dated 5^th May 2022, the 3^rd respondent was informed that the primary would hold on 18^th May 2022 (Exhibit FAA 35A) and that by a second notice dated 23^rd May 2022 the 3d respondent was informed that the primary was to be rescheduled to 26^th May 2022. It is the appellant’s contention that the letter dated 5^th May 2022 was delivered on 6^th May 2022 while the notice of rescheduling was delivered on 24^th May 2022. Applying Section 15 (2) (a) of the Interpretation Act, Learned counsel argued that in calculating the period, the day on which the event occurs must be excluded and therefore 6^th May 2022 to 26^th May 2022 is a period of 20 days. He submitted that it is the date of delivery of the document that is relevant for the computation of time: He referred to Ideozu Vs Ochoma (2006) 4 NWLR (Pt.970) 354; Nig. Telecommunications Ltd. Vs Okeke (2017) 1-2 SC (Pt.1) 39 @ 48; (2017) 9 NWLR (Pt.1571) 439

He submitted that in determining whether the requisite 21 days, notice was given, although the learned trial Judge conceded that from the date of delivery of Exhibit 35A to 26^th May 2022 was less than 21 days, he took into cognizance reference to an earlier letter of 6^th April 2022. He argued that there was no evidence that the said letter was ever delivered to the 3rd respondent and that the lower court was wrong to have affirmed the trial court’s finding on the issue. He argued that it is immaterial that the 3^rd respondent did not complain. He submitted that provisions such as Section 82(1) of the Electoral Act 2022 are for the public good and cannot be waived or their violation condoned.

He submitted further that the 2nd notice for the rescheduling of the primary breached Article 7.2. of the INEC Regulations and Guidelines for Political Primaries in that the notice must be given not later than 7 days to the new date. He submitted that from 25th May 2022 to 26^th May 2022 when the letter was delivered to the 3^rd respondent is less than 7 days.

Learned counsel submitted that although the lower court admitted Exhibit FAA 36 (previously rejected by the trial court) in evidence, it suo motu raised the issue of non-payment of certification fee without hearing the parties and thereby breached the appellant’s right to fair hearing. He argued that the court was not justified in holding that Exhibit FAA 36 is dubious having regard to the fact that the 3^rd respondent’s legal officer who certified Exhibit FAA 36 was in court and participated in the proceedings as counsel for the 3^rd respondent. He also submitted that the court below erred in holding that Exhibit FAA 37B was not in the court’s record, as the said document along with Exhibits FAA 37A and FAA 38 were referred to in the proceedings at the trial court on 16^th August 2022 (pages 3224 and 3227 vol.5 of the record referred to). He noted that the said document, initially omitted from the record, was subsequently transmitted to the lower court with leave, as an additional record. He submitted that the lower court erroneously mixed up the documents referred to and relied upon by the appellant

and therefore reached a wrong conclusion as to the weight to be attached to Exhibit FAA 36.

Respondents Submission

In response to the above submissions, learned counsel for the 1^st respondent reproduced the provisions of Article 26 (e) – (i) of the 2^nd respondent’s guidelines and submitted that the words are simple and ought to be given their ordinary meaning. Referring to the case of Umeakuna Vs Umeakuma (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt.1691) 61 @ 82-83, he submitted that there are circumstances where the word “shall” can be interpreted to convey an obligation while in certain circumstances it may be interpreted as being permissive and carrying the same meaning as the word “may”. He submitted that in the interpretation of statutes, the duty of the court is to ascertain the intention of the legislature from the ordinary words used and this can only be done by construing the statute as a whole. See: A.P.C. Vs A.S.I.E.C. (2022) NWLR (Pt. 1845) 423; Nobis-Elendu Vs INEC (2015) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1485) 197. He submitted that

a community reading of Article 26 of the 2^nd respondent’s guidelines reveals some discretion granted to conduct the exercise beyond the stipulated time where there is good and reasonable ground for doing so. He argued that the1^st respondent was able to demonstrate vide his affidavit evidence before the court that the conduct of the primary commenced on 26^th May 2022 as scheduled in the notice communicated to the 3^rd Respondent but was concluded on 27^th May 2022 due to the fact that the Senate, House of Representatives and State Houses of Assembly Primary Elections were also held on the same day. He submitted that the appellant did not controvert the evidence on record to the effect that accreditation commenced and continued beyond the stipulated time due to the late arrival of delegates and the large number of delegates on the queue. He also noted that it is not in dispute that the appellant and his agents were present at the venue of the exercise throughout and until the results were declared by the returning officer.

He submitted that the reference by the lower court to the African time/way of doing things was merely a means of giving a broad interpretation to the provisions of Article 26 of the guidelines to avoid absurdity.

On the applicability of the decision of the Court of Appeal in APC Vs Moghalu & Ors. (2020) LPELR 56993 (CA) and the decision of this court in Uba Vs Moghalu (2002) LPELR- 57876 (SC) to the facts of this case, learned counsel argued that they were decided on their own peculiar facts. He noted that in the instant case, the appellant alleged that the primary was postponed from 26^th May to 27^th May 2022. He distinguished the facts of that case from the instant case and argued that the impunity exhibited in Uba Vs Moghalu(supra) where the 1^st defendant therein conducted its primary surreptitiously in the night after all the aspirants (apart from the appellant) and the INEC officials had left the venue, was not present in the instant case, particularly as the appellant and his agents were fully on ground, participated fully and he scored 13 votes.

Other distinguishing features noted by counsel are that in Moghalu’s case it was a direct primary where the election Was to be conducted in each of the wards in the State, while in the present case it was an indirect primary conducted at a single venue in the state capital.

Furthermore, that the Regulation 18(e) and (h) of the erstwhile guidelines of the 2nd respondent which was interpreted in Moghalu’s case is not the same as Article 26 of the extant Guidelines. It is submitted that Article 26 has modified the earlier regulations by the phrase “at 12pm or whenever accreditation ends, the returning officer shall declare accreditation closed, but ensure that all eligible members already on queue for accreditation by_12.00pm are accredited” which renders the interpretation of the word “shall discretionary and not mandatory. He maintained that Moghalu’s case was decided on its peculiar facts. He referred to Ugwuanyi Vs NICON Insurance Plc (2013) LPELR – 20092 (SC)@63; INEC& Anor. Vs Ray (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1892) 129.

On the alleged breach of the appellant’s right to fair hearing with regard to Section 124(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act, learned counsel submitted that by sub Section (3) of the said Section, the need to afford a party an opportunity to address the court on a notorious fact, is as the court deems necessary. He submitted that it is common knowledge that the presidential primaries of APC and PDP which were televised nationwide, lasted through the night and spilled over to the following day and that there is noting the appellant could have added to or subtracted from the notorious fact by way of address or submission.

As regards the appellant’s contention that the lower court erred in its finding that he failed to prove infraction of the 2^nd respondent’s guidelines as to the date and time for the conduct of the primary election, he submitted that the appellant sought declaratory reliefs and the burden was therefore on him to establish his claims on the strength of his own case. He referred to INEC Vs ACD (2012) 14 NWLR (Pt.1850) 211: Andrew Vs INEC

(2011) 9 NWLR (Pt.1625) 507 @574; Omisore Vs Aregbesola (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt.1482) 205 522.

He submitted that by paragraphs 28 & 40 of the appellant’s affidavit in support of his Originating Summons, the appellant’s complaint is that the 2^nd respondent unilaterally changed the date and time for the primary election from 26^th May 2022 to 27^th May 2022 without notice to the 3^rd respondent. He noted that the respondents denied this assertion through their respective counter affidavits supported by relevant exhibits. For example, Exhibit INEC 1 attached to 3^rd Respondent’s Further Counter Affidavit states that the Governorship Primaries held on 26^th May 2022 to 27^th May 2022 from 9:00pm to 6:am at Aminu Kano Triangle… with accreditation of 1435 delegates drawn from the 29 LGAs and 9 contestants were involved (also attached to 1^st respondent’s counter affidavit as Exhibit Jigawa 9 at pages’ 2815 to 2820 of Volume 5 of the record). He observed that Exhibit FAA 36 upon which the appellant relies for his contention that the primary took place on 27^th May 2022 is an incomplete hand-written document

which is unsigned. He submitted, relying on Alikor Vs Ogwo (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt.1695) 331 @ 369, that the lower court was right not to accord any probative value to the document, notwithstanding that it overruled the trial court on its admissibility.

On the difference between the admissibility of a document and its probative value, he referred to Nyesom Vs Peterside & Ors. (2016) LPELR-40036 (SC). He observed that the document does not bear the logo of the 3^rd respondent to give it any presumption of regularity and that the only feature linking it to the 3^rd respondent is the alleged certification said to have been paid for vide Exhibit FAA 38. He noted that the said document is not a receipt of payment for certification of Exhibit FAA 36 but a receipt for payment for the APC Constitution and Guidelines for 2022 Primary Elections. In the circumstances, he submitted that the lower court was right not to attach any probative value to Exhibit FAA 36.

At paragraphs 4.51 to 4.53 at pages 20- 23 of his brief, learned counsel for the 1^st respondent made

reference to the notice of appeal filed before the lower court, particularly Ground 10 thereby and, arguments canvassed in the appellant’s brief before the lower court on the issue of the certification of Exhibit FAA 36 as well as the 1^st respondent’s reaction thereto, and argued that it is not correct, as alleged by the appellant, that the lower court raised the issue suo motu and resolved same without hearing the parties. He submitted that in any event there has been no miscarriage of justice as the issue of proper certification is an issue of law that Concerns mandatory compliance with Section 104 of the Evidence Act, which the court can raise suo motu and decide without hearing the parties. He referred to Gbagbarigha Vs Toruemi (2013) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1350) 289, He submitted further that the presence of the 3^rd respondent’s legal officer in court as part of the 3^rd respondent’s defence team cannot detract from the requirement to prove that the certification was paid for, particularly as he was not in court as à witness.

On the alleged mix up by the lower court by referring to Exhibit FÅA 37 instead of Exhibit FAA 37B and reference to Exhibit FAA 38 as the receipt for payment for the certification of Exhibit FAA 36, he submitted that at the end of the day the lower court was right in holding that there was no receipt shown for payment of certification of Exhibit FAA 36. He submitted that in the circumstances there has not been any miscarriage of justice by the court’s pronouncement. On the need for the court to eschew technicalities in favour of substantial justice, he referred to Andrew Vs INEC (2018)9 NWLR (Pt. 1025) 507; Adegbuyi Vs APC (2015) 2 NWLR (PL 1442) 1 25 paid for, particularly as he was not in court as a witness.

Learned counsel observed that two documents relied upon by the appellant in proof of the date and time of the conduct of the primary, i.e. Exhibit FAA 37B attached to the further and better affidavit in response to 3^rd respondent’s counter affidavit to the, Originating Summons and Exhibit MDA 20A attached to the Further

and Better Affidavit in opposition to the 2^nd respondent’s Counter affidavit, purportedly emanating from the 3^rd respondent and authored by the same Dr Mahmuda Isah, are virtually the same except that while Exhibit FAA 37B states that the primary held on 27th to 28th May 2022, Exhibit MDA 20A states that the primary election held on 26^th – 27th May 2022. He argued that the documents are contradictory, and the court is not permitted to pick and choose which version to believe. In the circumstances, he submitted that the appellant failed to prove the allegation of change of date and time.

It was submitted that the counter affidavit of the respondents including the 3rd respondent who monitored the election all showed that the election held on the 26^th and was concluded on 27th May 2022.

On the issue of compliance with Section 82(1) of the Electoral Act regarding the notice to be given to the 3^rd respondent for the conduct of a primary election, it was argued that the provision ought to be given its natural meaning and that it cannot be the intendment of the law

that after the necessary notice has been given in accordance with the law, in the event of a rescheduling, as happened in the instant case, a further 21 days, notice Ought to be given. It was argued that it would amount to importing extraneous mattes into the legislation, which is not permitted. See: A.G. Federation Vs A.G. Lagos State (2013) 16 NWLR (Pt.1380) 249 317 D-C.

He argued that both the notice of 6th May 2022 and the rescheduling notice of 24th May 2022 refer to the same primary election and that in the notice of 6^th May 2022 (Exhibit FAA 35A) reference was made to the earlier notice dated 6th April 2022. He submitted that since the documents relate to the same transaction, they were rightly considered as a whole and the learned trial Judge rightly found that the computation of time commenced from the date of the original notice of 6th April 2022 and not from the date of the notice of rescheduling. He referred to Animashaun & Anor, Vs Ogundimu & Ors. (2015) LPELR -25979 (CA)

Relying on several authorities, including P.D.P., Vs INEC (2014) 17 NWLR (Pt.1437) 525 and Ngige Vs INEC 2015) 1 NWLR (Pt.1440) 124, learned counsel argued that due to the sui generics nature of election related matters, where time is of the essence, the provision of Interpretation Act as it not applicable, as time stipulated in the Electoral Act, Practice Directions and the 1999 Constitution, as amended, from the day of the act and date on which the event occurs is not excluded. He submitted that in any event, there is no denial by the 3^rd respondent that it did not receive the earlier notice dated 6th April 2022 and the appellant is not in a position to admit or deny receipt of the letter since it was not addressed to him.

On behalf of the 2^nd respondent, it is argued that the lower court was right not to place any probative value on Exhibit FAA 36, a handwritten and unsigned document.

Reliance was placed on the authority of Alikor Vs Ogwo (supra) and Dalek (Nig) Ltd Vs Ompadec (2007) 7 NWLR (Pt.1033 402@ 441.

As regards the contention that the election was postponed without notice to the 3^rd respondent, he submitted that the date of the primary was never postponed so as to require the issuance of a notice of a new date to the 3^rd respondent and other interested parties. He referred to the evidence of the 3^rd respondent who monitored the election captured in its further counter affidavit to the Originating Summons filed on 14th July 2022 and Exhibit INEC 1 to the effect that the election held on 26th to 27th May 2022 from 9:00pm to 6:00am at Aminu Kano Triangle Square, Sani Abacha Way, Dutse, etc.

On the interpretation of Article 26 of the 2^nd respondent’s guidelines, learned Counsel’s submissions are in tandem with the submissions of learned counsel for the 1st respondent to the effect that the courts below Correctly ascribed the plain and ordinary words used in the statute their natural grammatical meaning. He is equally of the view that the facts of this case were property distinguished from the facts of Uba Vs

Moghalu (supra) by the court below. He noted that unlike what transpired in Moghalu’s case, in the instant case the 3^rd respondent not only monitored the election, it produced a report. He submitted further that the appellant had made a mountain out of a mole hill Concerning the lower court’s reference to the “ubiquitous African-man’s time way of doing things,” which was merely an obiter and did not form the basis for the court’s decision.

The submissions of learned counsel for the 3^rdrespondent are similar to those of learned counsel for the 2^nd respondent. It is emphasised that the appellant’s case at the trial court, by his pleadings, was that the date for the primary election was shifted from 26th May 2022 to 27th May 2022. He pointed out that there is nowhere in the appellant’s supporting affidavit where he alleged that the primary was conducted at a particular time instead of the time stipulated in the guidelines but rather that the election did not hold on 26th May 2022. On this basis he submitted that Moghalu’s case is inapplicable to the facts

of this case. He submitted that in arguing this appeal, the appellant has deviated from the case he made out for himself by his pleadings. On the need parties to be Consistent in the presentation of their cases, reference was made to Abubakar Vs Yar’Adua (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 1 154 A – B: Okadigbo Vs Emeka & Ors (2012) 1 SCN 202 @ 214 A-C.

Learned counsel submitted that in an action seeking declaratory reliefs, the appellant must succeed on the strength of his case notwithstanding any admission in the defendant’s pleading or weakness in his case. He submitted that in the instant case, the appellant failed to establish his case of change of the date of the primary election without notice to him and his case was bound to fail.

In his reply on points of law, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the appellant’s case was that the primary did not commence at 8am as stipulated in the guidelines and that by its own report (Exhibit APC 5B) the 2nd respondent showed that the committee agreed to

Commence the election by 4:00pm; hat as a delegates were not seated and that the election commenced by 11:30pm. It was argued that notwithstanding the fact that the appellant sought declaratory reliefs, this amounts to an admission against interest and the court ought not to close its eyes to it.

Learned counsel Contended that there is no difference between the provisions of Article 18(e) and (h) of the APC Guidelines which were considered in Moghalu’s case (supra) and Article 26(e) and (i) of the party’s extant Guidelines which would render the decision inapplicable.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE 1

In the de termination of this appeal, it is necessary to take cognisance of the fact that it is an appeal against concurrent findings of fact by the two lower courts. The law is quite well settled that an app2liate court does not generally interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless such findings are shown to be perverse. A decision or finding is said to be perverse where t runs counter the pleadings and evidence on record; or where the learned

trial Judge took into account matters which he ought not to have taken into account or shut his eyes to the obviously or where legal principles are wrongly applied to correctly ascertained facts. In any of these instances, the court would be justified to interfere to avoid a miscarriage of justice. See: Atolagbe Vs Shorun (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.2) 360; Abegunde Vs Ondo State House of Assembly & Ors. (2015) LPELR-24588 (SC) @ 25 26 E- B; The Registered Trustees of Deeper Christian Life Ministry Vs Ebodaghe (2022) LPELR – 5848 (SC)@ 19-20 E- B. The duty of the appellant therefore is to satisfy the court that the concurrent findings are perverse.

Before considering the submissions of learned counsel for the respective parties, I am of the considered view that is it necessary to scrutinise the appellant’s Originating Summons and the pleadings as contained in the supporting affidavit to understand the grievance he took before the trial court. Paragraphs 7,12, 15, 16,17,18, 27 (ii), 30, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40, and 43 of the affidavit at

pages 9-57 of volume 1 of the record are illustrative and are reproduced below:

7. The 1^st Defendant is also an aspirant and was purportedly declared the winner of the 2^nd Defendant’s primary election which was schedule to hold on the 26h day of May 2022 but was held on the 27^th day of May 2022, at Aminu Kano Triangle Dutse Jigawa State, for the 2^nd Defendant’s Governorship Candidate for Jigawa State at the forthcoming coming 2023 General Election.

12 In Exhibit FAA6, the 2^nd Defendant issued a Notice of Conduct of Special Congress, for the election of five (5) State Delegates from each ward in the Local Government Areas in Jigawa State, who were to serve as Delegates for the State Congress to nominate Gubernatorial candidate for the party.

15. I went round the entire Jigawa State to mobilize and encourage my supporters through intense and rigorous campaigns with ensuing, heavy financial Consequences due to logistics and cost of touring the 287 Wards in the 27 Local Government Area of Jigawa State.

16. My intense campaign made my supporters to purchase the State Delegate Nomination Forms so as to participate and be elected as State Delegates, or them to vote for me during the State Congress of the Gubernatorial Primary Election in Jigawa State

17. I also know as of facts that the above said 827 people are bonafide members of the 2^nd Defendant who expressed intention to become Delegates from

all the 287 Wards in 22 out of 27 Local Government Areas in Jigawa State and had duly purchased and obtained the 2 Defendant’s State: Delegate Nomination Forms.

18. After I mobilized my supporters, and at least 827 from the 287 wards of Jigawa State, my supporters that purchased the State Delegates forms, assured me of their votes as State Delegates in the 2^nd Defendant’s Governorship Primary Election for Jigawa State for the forthcoming 2023 General Election

27. I was informed on the 19^th May 2022 in my residence at No. 1 Farouk Adamu Aliyu Link, Birnin Kudu, Jigawa State, Between the hours of 12:00pm and 3:00pm when receiving briefing over the Conduct of the Special Congress from my 22 Local Government Campaign Organisation Coordinators, namely… information I verily believe to be true and correct as follows:

iii. The respective aspirants for the post of State Delegates went to the designated venues for the conduct of the State Delegate Elections between the period of 7am – 10pm on both days but the Delegate Elections did not hold and the officials of 2^nd Defendant who were appointed to superintend the election did not show up, which made all the 827 Delegates win unopposed.

30. The party surreptitiously changed the date of the Primaries from the 26^th May 2022 to the 2^nd May 2022. Each Aspirant vas directed to send in Agents who will supervise the voting process. I nominated Alhaji Adamu Muazu. Mansur Da’u Aliyu,

Murtala Isa Esq., Mal. Ali lbrahim and Mohammed Dutse as my agents.

31. To the best of my knowledge there was no proper notice as to the change in time and date of the primary election, and the 2^nd Defendants official flagrantly with no regards to my right as an aspirant did not keep to any of the schedule of both time and date in conducting the primaries either on. the 265 May 2022 or the 27^th May 2022, the self and unilateral changes on the date fixed for the Gubernatorial Primary Election in Jigawa State in compliance with the provisions of 3^rd Defendant’s Regulation and Guidelines on gubernatorial primaries as to the date and time sent or communicated in writing to the 3^rd Defendant as required in Exhibit FAA4.

32. I know as of fact there was no accreditation was done on the 26h May 2022 or 2zh May 2022 by the 2^nd Defendant’s Primary Election Committee, from 8:00am-12:00pm or anytime before the purported Gubernatorial Primary Election held in Jigawa State.

33. On the 27^th May 2022, also 827 eligible Delegates were not allowed into the venue nor were they allowed to vote at the Primaries. Rather, I saw group of unknown persons who never aspired to become State Delegates were presented in the election day as the Delegates

39. I know as of fact that the 2^nd Defendant’s official that Conducted the charade primary election on the 27^th May 2022 did not even attempt to conduct accreditation of Voters/Delegates, and did not Conduct accreditation at all for the purported primaries election at all. I know also had the 2^nd Defendant done proper accreditation using the list

of duly unopposed nominate State Delegates, I would have won the primary elections.

40. I know as of fact that had the 2^nd Defendant held the Primaries on the 26^th May 2022, and with the lawful and eligible Delegates I would have von the primaries.

43. That by depriving the 827 unopposed State delegates the right to vote, I was not given equal opportunity by the APC with other contestants.

It is quite evident that the appellant complaints were:

1. That the 2^nd respondent surreptitiously changed the date of the primaries from 26^th May 2022 to 27^th May 2022 without proper notice as to the change in date and time.

2. That the 2^nd respondent did not adhere to its schedule as to the date and time of conduct of the primaries.

3 That there was no accreditation of delegates and

4. That his 827 unopposed delegates were not allowed to vote and that if they Had been allowed to vote, he would have won the election.

The first issue to be resolved is therefore whether indeed the 2^nd respondent changed the date of the primary from 26^th May 2022 to 27th May 2022 without giving the requisite notice to the 3d respondent. In paragraphs 10-14 of the appellant’s Further and Better Affidavit in answer to the 3rd defendant’s counter

affidavit to the Originating Summons, he made the following assertions:

(i) that by a hand written report of the primary issued by the 3^rd respondent, annexed as Exhibit FAA 36, it was stated that the election was conducted on 27^th – 28^th May 2022. The hand written report was said to have been certified by B.I Wuyep, Assistant Director legal of the 3^rd respondent.

(ii) That by a letter dated 28/6/2022, the appellant’s solicitors applied for a certified true copy of the report submitted by the Jigawa State Resident Electoral Commissioner to 3^rd Defender’s Headquarters. A copy of the letter and a certified true copy of the report were annexed as Exhibit FAA 37A and FAA 378 respectively.

(ii) Payment receipt for the said certification was said to have been annexed as Exhibit FAA 38

On their part, the 3^rd respondent exhibited Exhibit INEC 1 as a certified true copy of the same report while the 1^st respondent Exhibited the same report as Exhibit Jigawa 9. All the Exhibits were said to have been certified by B.I. Wuyep Esq. There is also Exhibit MDA 20A annexed to paragraph 14 of the appellant’s further affidavit in response to the 2^nd defendant’s counter affidavit. It has the same content as Exhibit INEC 1 and also bears an endorsement of payment of certification fee

of N1,140.00. The bone of contention is that while Exhibit FAA 36 and FAA 37B state that the primary was conducted on 27^th to 28^th May 2022, Exhibit INEC 1 which is the same as Exhibit Jigawa 9 and Exhibit MDA 20A state that the primary held on 26^th to 27^th May 2022 from 9:00pm to 6:00am.

The onus was on the appellant to establish the truth of his, assertions. Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the lower court was wrong when it held that Exhibit FAA 38 did not form part of the record and that the application for certification referred to as Exhibit FAA 37A was also not annexed thereto. He was able to show that the Exhibit FAA 38 and Exhibit FAA 37B (erroneously referred to by the lower court as Exhibit 37A) did indeed form part of the court’s record. Exhibit FAA 38 which can be found at page 3443 of Volume 5 of the record indicates that it is a “receipt for CTC IRO [in respect of] APC Constitution and Guidelines for 2022 APC Primaries (sic) Election’. On its face there is no indication that it is a receipt for the certification of the 3^rd respondent’s report, Exhibit FAA 37B, which is said to be the same as the

handwritten and unsigned Exhibit FAA36, Exhibit FAA 37A at page 3436 of the record which is the application by appellant’s solicitors for certified true copies of certain documents list the documents as follows:

1. The two new Constitutions of All Progressives Congress (APC) filed after the March 2022 Convention.

2. Guidelines for the conduct of 2022 All Progressives Congress’s Primary Election.

3 List of leadership elected from ward to state level in Jigawa State.

4. All Progressives Congress’s membership registers for all wards in Jigawa State.

It is dated 27th April 2022, clearly before the conduct of the Primary and therefore does not cover the report of the primary said to be evidenced by Exhibits FAA 36 and FAA 37B, The Remita receipt exhibited at page 3444 also merely indicates that it is a receipt for CTC of Document”

without stating which document. This point is conceded in the appellant’s reply brief where in paragraph 22 thereof, learned counsel argued that there is no law that a receipt must outline all the documents applied for.

It is the appellant’s contention that the lower court raised the issue of the certification of Exhibit FAA 36 suo

motu without affording the parties a hearing on the issue and thereby breached his right to fair hearing. As stated earlier, learned counsel for the 1^st respondent reproduced Ground 10 of the notice of appeal before the lower court and the submissions of counsel in respect thereof. The contention that the due certification of Exhibit FAA 36 was raised suo motu by the court is misconceived.

The appellant has argued that having been duly certified, the lower court ought to have given Exhibit FAA 36 its due probative value, notwithstanding that it is an unsigned document.

Sections 146(1) of the Evidence Act, 2011 provides thus:

“146 (1) The court shall presume every document purporting to be a certificate, certified copy or other document, which is by law declared to be admissible as evidence of any particular fact and which purports to be duly certified by any officer Nigeria who Is duly authorised in that behalf to be genuine, provided that such documents substantially in the form and purports to be executed in the manner directed by law in that behalf,”

Sections 104 and 105 of the Evidence Act provide:

“104 (1) Every Public Officer having custody of a public document which any person has a right to inspect shall give that person on demand a copy of it upon payment of the legal fees prescribed in that respect together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part of it as the case may be.

105. Copies of documents certified in accordance with Section 104 may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents of which they purport to be copies.”

The above provisions clearly reveal that before a court can place reliance on a certified true copy of a public document, certain requirements must be met, one of which is that necessary payment for the certification must have been made. As rightly submitted by learned counsel for the respondents, the admissibility of a document and the weight to be attached to it are two different things. While admissibility is based on relevance, the probative value to be ascribed to the evidence depends on proof. Evidence is said to have probative value if it tends to prove an issue. See: ACN Vs Lamido (2012) 8 NWLR

(Pt. 1383) 560 Nyesom Vs_Peterside (2016) LPELR-40036 (SC) 56 A-E; Buhari Vs INEC (2008) 19 NWLR (Pt. 1120) 246.

In the instant case, the courts were faced with Exhibit INEC 1 (Jigawa 9 and MDA 20A), Exhibit FAA 36- a hand written unsigned report not written on any official letter headed paper and Exhibit FAA 37B said to be a certified true copy of Exhibit FAA 36. Exhibit INEC 1 (Jigawa 9 and MDA 20A), emanated from the 3^rd respondent who monitored the primary election. Despite the alleged mix-up by the court below as to the existence of Exhibit FAA 38, the said exhibit does not constitute proof of payment for the certification of Exhibit FAA 36. It has been held severally by this court that the function of an appellate court is primarily to determine whether a decision appealed against is right or wrong and not necessarily whether the reasons for the decision are right or wrong. See: Wilson Vs Oshin (209C) 5 SC (Pt.III) 1: (2000) LPELR-3497(SC) @ 36-31E-A; Arisa Vs. The State (1988) LPELR – 553(SC) @ 13-19F

-A Ojegbende Vs Esan & Anor. (2001) LPELR= 2372 (SC) @ 31 C-D.

In the circumstances of this case, I am of the considered view, that the court below as right in refusing to accord Exhibit FAA 36 and by extension Exhibit FAA 37B any probative value. I place reliance on the authority of Alikor Vs Ogwo & Ors. (2019) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1695) 331@ 369 per Augie, JSC to the effect that a document cannot pass as the act of a particular person without a signature. Not only is Exhibit FAA 36 not signed, there is nothing on it to suggest that it is a document emanating from the 3^rd respondent. The document is a worthless piece of paper. It is also immaterial that the person who allegedly certified the document was in court and participated in the proceedings since he was neither a party nor a witness in the case. When faced with such a questionable document, the lower courts was right to have preferred the properly certified documents tendered by the respondents, particularly the 3^rd respondent who monitored the primary. As rightly held by that court, the

rejection of Exhibit FAA 36 knocks the bottom off the appellant’s claim that the primary election was conducted on 27^th to 28^th May 2022.

The next issue is the contention that the two lower courts erred in interpreting Article 26 (e) to (i) of the 2^nd respondent’s Guidelines as having an element of discretion and not being strictly mandatory. The relevant provisions are reproduced below

“(a) Accreditation shall be done by the Returning officer between the hours of 8:00am to 12:00pm. Any aspirant or agent who arrives after the commencement of voting shall not be accredited or allowed to vote.

(g) At 12:00pm or whenever the accreditation ends, the Returning Officer shall declare accreditation closed but ensure that all eligible members already on the queue for accreditation by 12:00noon are accredited

(i) voting shall commence immediately accreditation ends and continue till 2:00pm when voting closes. Voters shall queue up at the voting centre.”

The is no doubt that a political party, as a voluntary association, is bound by its constitution and guidelines and must adhere strictly thereto I “order to avoid

arbitrariness and impunity. See: APC Vs. Karfi (2017) LPELR 47024 (SC) 33-34 A – A (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt.1592) 457; Aguma Vs APC & Ors. (2021) PLELR-55927 (SC) @ 50 A- F. It is also settled law that in the interpretation of statutes words must be given their natural and ordinary meaning unless it would lead to absurdity. See: Ojokolobo Vs Alamu (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.61) 377 @ 402 F- H, Ibrahim Vs Barde (1996) 9 NWLR (Pt.474) 513; Uzodinma Vs Izunaso (No.2) (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt.1275) 30 Uba Vs Moghalu (supra).

A careful examination of sub-paragraphs (e) and (g) of Article 26 reveals some qualification to the period stipulated for accreditation and voting. By sub-paragraph (e), accreditation should commence by 8:00arm and be concluded by 12:00noon. However, the inclusion of the words “or whenever accreditation ends in sub-paragraph (g) appears to take cognizance of the fact that accreditation may not end by 12:00noon and that anyone already on the queue by that time must be accredited. It

follows therefore that where persons have arrived for accreditation within the stipulated time and were on the queue, they must be accredited and allowed to’ vote no matter how long it takes. In other word, accreditation may not end strictly at 12noon.

It is a correct statement of the law that generally, when the word “shall” is used in a statute, it is interpreted to be mandatory. However, whether it is used in a mandatory or directory sense depends on the context in which it is used. See: Katto Vs C. B. N. (1991)9 NWLR (Pt.214) 126; (1991) LPELR – 1678 (SC) @ 25-26 F-D; BPS Construction & Engineering Co. Ltd Vs. FCDA (2017) 10 NWLR (Pt.1572) 1; Umeakuna Vs Umeakuna (2019) 14 NWLR (Pt.1691) 61. The court below held inter alia, at page 3644 of Volume 5 of the record:

“I am in agreement with the leaned trial Judge that these provisions of the Respondent’s Guidelines for its primary election allows for minor Concession/adjustment where the situation calls for it. For instance, it states that though accreditation time is 8:00arm to 12pm any

voter in the queue for accreditation before12am should be accredited and not turned away.”

In further illustration of this position, the court proceeded to take Judicial notice of the fact that the national conventions of the 2^nd respondent and the main opposition party, Peoples Democratic Congress, which were witnessed live on national TV stated very late and Continued through the night to the following day referring to “our ubiquitous African man ‘s time way doing things.

Learned Counsel for the appellant has made very heavy weather of this comment as already noted. I agree with learned counsel for the respondent’s that the comment regarding African time was merely an obiter of the learned Justice and did not from part of the ratio of the decision. The ratio of the decision was that having provided certain qualifications to Article 26 (g) of its guidelines, it could not be interpreted to mean that 12 noon was a hard cut-off point for accreditation to end no matter the circumstances on ground. I am not persuaded that there was a breach of the appellant’s right to fair

hearing simply because the lower court took judicial notice of a notorious fact.

It has also been argued forcefully that the lower Courts ought to have held themselves bound by the decision of this court in Uba Vs Moghalu (supra). In a recent decision of this court in APC Vs Dele Moses & Ors. (2021) 14 NWLR (Pt.1796) 278 per Augie, JSC, reference was made to a decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India Vs Dhanwanti Devi (1996) 6 SCC 44 to the effect that in the determination of whether a decision qualifies as precedent, a Judge must chisel out the reason or rationale for a particular decision and not just pick a sentence here and there. The court is required to ascertain the reason or principle upon which the court based its decision. The court must consider what the facts of the case are and the point that had to be decided.

In effect, a case is only an authority for what it decides and nothing more. Where the facts of the earlier case differ from the facts of the later case, the decision

in the former cannot serve as precedent in the latter case.

See: Adegoke Motors Ltd. Vs Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR LPt109) 250 Ugwuanyi Vs NICON Insurance Plc (2013) LPELR – 2009 (SC) 68: INEC &Anor. Vs Ray (2004) 14 NWLR (Pt.892) 129

In Mogalu’s case (supra) the 1^st respondent and several other aspirants were screened and cleared to Contest the primary election of the All Progressives Congress (APC) held on 26^th June 2021. Both the 1 respondent and the appellant sent out their field agents to monitor the election in ail the wards in Anambra State. On the day of the elections, the Election Committee was nowhere to be found in any of the wards. The 1^st respondent and other aspirants waited from 8:00am till 5:30pm for the Election Committee to arrive. It failed to show up. Meanwhile, the 2^nd respondent, INEC was also on ground to monitor the election and equally waited in vain. The 1^st respondent, INEC officials and other aspirants eventually left the venue without any election

Conducted. Surprisingly, the following day, 27^th June 2021, the Election Committee surfaced at Agulu Hotel, Anambra State and announced bogus election results in favour of the appellant. The 1st respondent challenged the return of the appellant at the trial court alleging non- Compliance and breach of the Party’s regulations and guidelines as well as the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended). Judgment was entered in his favour. The appellant’s appeals to the Court of Appeal and later to this court were unsuccessful.

This court found and held, inter alia, that the Election Committee adjusted the time for accreditation of voters without any authorization and proceeded to conduct the election in the dead of night after all the aspirants, voters and INEC officials had left the scene with only the appellant as the sole contestant. The brazen impunity exhibited by the primary election committee in flagrant disregard of the party’s guidelines was roundly condemned by this court.

The facts of Moghalu’s case (supra) are quite distinguishable from the instant case. I had earlier held in the course of this judgment that the appellant failed to prove that the election was moved from 26^th May 2022 to 27^th May 2022, while in Moghalu’s case the election committee deliberately failed to show up until all the contestants, agents and INEC officials had left the venue and then proceeded to conduct a sham election in the dead of night with only one contestant.

Furthermore, in the instant case, not only did the 3^rd respondent monitor the election, all the aspirants, including the appellant and his agents were present and fully participated. Indeed, it was the appellant’s contention that if his 827 delegates had been allowed to participate he would have won the primary. The 3^rd respondent produced a report show ng that the primary election commenced on the 26^th May 2022 and was Concluded on the 27^th May 2022. This is a different Scenario from the appellant’s contention that the 2^nd

respondent surreptitiously postponed the primary election.

The court below held, rightly in my view, that the situation in Moghalu’s case, (supra) is not the same as the instant case where the respondent’s contention that other primary elections were held simultaneously with the Governorship Primary in issue and therefore even though the election commenced on 26^th May 2022, it over flowed to the next day, 27^th May 2022, was not disputed by the appellant. I am unable to fault the lower court in this regard.

The appellant has argued that the 2^nd respondent breached Section 82(1) of the Evidence Act in the notice of the primary given to the 3^rd respondent. I had earlier referred to paragraphs 30 and 31 of the Appellant’s affidavit in support of the Originating Summons wherein he alleged that the date of the primary election was postponed to 27^th May 2022 without due notice given as to the new date. Having held that the appellant failed to prove that the primary election was postponed to 27^th

May 2022, this would appear to be a moot point.

However, the appellant contends that the notice of rescheduled primary dated 5th May 2022 Was delivered to the 3^rd respondent on 6^th May 2022 and that counting from 6^th May 2022 to 26^th May 2022 and relying on Section 15(2) (a) of the Interpretation Act, is a period of 20 days and therefore less than the statutory requirement of 21 days.

It must be reiterated here that election related matters are sui generis and time sensitive. It has been held severally by this court that the Interpretation Act is not applicable with regard to the computation of time. See: Ngige Vs INEC (2015) 1 NWLR (PŁ. 1440) 281 @318-319 G-B; Omisore & Anor. Vs Aregbesola & (2015) LPELR -24803 (SC) 78 C-E Okechukwu Vs INEC & Ors. (2014) 9 SC_1. His Lordship Ariwoola, JSC (now CJN), in Okechukwu Vs INEC (supra) held at page 30, thus:

“Being aware of the sui generis nature of election and election related matters in which time is of the essence, and the stand of this court on

the interpretation of the Practice Direction yis à vis the interpretation Act, I hold no hesitation in Concluding that the provision of the Interpretation Act on computation of time shall not apply to the requirement of time by our Practice Directions. Time shall run in the peculiarity of our Electoral Act, Practice Directions and the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) from the day of the act and the day shall not be excluded.”

There was evidence before the trial court vide Exhibits FAA 35A and FAA 35B at pages 3426 and 3428 of Vol. 5 of the record that notices were issued for the rescheduling of the primary election. By Exhibit FAA 35A dated 5^th May 2022 but received on 6^th May 2022 by the 3^rd respondent, the 2^nd respondent gave notice that it had reviewed and re-scheduled its Governorship primaries to 18th May 2022. By Exhibit FAA 35B dated 23rd May 2022 but received by the 3^rd respondent on 24th May 2022, the 2^nd respondent gave a further rescheduling notice for the Governorship Primary to 26^th May 2022, Exhibit FAA 35B refers to the 2^nd respondent’s previous letter dated 18^th May 2022 with Ref. No. APC/NHDO/INEC/19/022/56, while. Exhibit FAA 35A refers to its earlier letter

referenced APC/NHD0/INEC/19022/46 dated 6 April 2022 on the above subject i.e. “Notice for conduct of Primaries for the nomination of candidates”

There is no doubt that by virtue of Section 82(1) of the Electoral Act, every registered political party shall give the 3^rd respondent (INEC) at least 21 days, notice of any congress, conference or meeting convened for the purpose of nominating candidates for elective office under the Act. The provision is mandatory and failure to give the said notice shall, by virtue of Section 82(5) of the Act, ender the convention, congress, conference or meeting invalid. As observed above, Exhibits FAA 35A and FAA 35B are notices of re-scheduling of previously Scheduled primaries.

The learned trial Judge examined Some excerpts from the documents and held thus:

“It is not hard to decipher from these excerpts that the 2^nd respondent had previously issued notices to the 3^rd respondent, the earliest dated 6^th April, 2022 and that in my humble crew would be the

date time began to run and not the subsequent notices to reschedule the primaries

It is crystal clear that an earlier notice was issued by the 2^nd defendant to the 3^rd defendant on the 6^th of April, counting from which 21 days would have elapsed long before the 20^th or 27^th May 2022 when the primary election was purportedly held and I hold that there is no breach of Section 82 of the Electoral Act.

In affirming this finding, the court below held thus;

“Here the trial Judge made the necessary calculations and held that 2^nd respondent met the 21 days’ time stipulated by Section 82 (1) of the Electoral Act 2022 for Notice of Primary election to be given to INEC That the notice of the rescheduling from 25^th May to 26^th May 2022 cannot be counted as a new notice that needs 21 days’ notice, so 2^nd respondent was in order. That argument is impregnable. The 21 days’ notice stipulated is to afford INEC Sufficient time to Prepare for its monitoring duty. INEC has not Complained that the 2^nd respondent gave it insufficient notice of its said primary election and even issued a report tendered by the appellant as Exhibit FAA 36. Appellant, in my opinion is simply quibbling with this complaint.

Has the appellant satisfied this court that the concurrent findings are perverse? I think not. As already stated, in the interpretation of a statute the court must give the words their plain and ordinary meaning and must not interpret the provisions in a manner that would lead to absurdity. I agree with their Lordships of the two lower Courts that in election matters, which are time bound, it cannot be the intention of the Legislature that not only the initial notice but every notice of rescheduling must be given at least 21 days before the date fixed for the particular election. Such an interpretation would lead to absurdity.

Furthermore, it is quite evident from Exhibit FAA 35A that an earlier notice had been given dated 6^th April 2022

I agree with learned counsel for the 1^st and 2^nd respondents that it does not lie in the mouth of the appellant to query receipt of the earlier notice by the 3^rd respondent where the 3rd respondent itself has not challenged same.

I hold that the findings of the two lower courts on this issue are supported by the record and cannot be held to be perverse.

In conclusion, this issue is resolved against the appellant.

ISSUE 2

Appellant’s Submissions

learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the lower court misconstrued his case. That his case was

that the 2^nd respondent failed to conduct special Congresses in Jigawa State and that if there were any delegates at all to vote in the 2despondent’s Gubernatorial Primary, it would have been the 827 party members who complied with the laid down procedure for formalising an aspiration to become a delegate. He contended that the appellant’s case was centred on the non-eligibility of the purported delegates who were alleged to have voted in the primary. He argued that the

lower court failed to adopt a holistic approach in reading the plaintiff’s pleading in order to determine his claim.

He submitted that the plaintiff’s case was that there were no valid or eligible voters at the primary election because there were no delegates produced by special congresses as required by law and therefore there could not have been a valid accreditation for the purpose of the election. Learned counsel submitted that the 827 persons as shown in Exhibit FAA S (1 – 241) and Exhibit FAA 7 (forwarding letter) are the only persons who complied with the requirements stipulated in the 2^nd respondent’s Notice for Conduct of the Special Ward Congress (Exhibit FAA 5) in line with Section 84(8) of the Electoral Act 2022. He submitted that having shown that the 827 persons duly compiled, with the requirement, the appellant had discharged the burden of proof placed on him and that the onus shifted to the 1t and 2nd respondent to show that those who purportedly voted duly complied with the requirements in Exhibit FAA 5. by adducing evidence Similar to Exhibit FAA 8 (1-241).

Leaned counsel submitted that in the face of admission by the respondents that the 827 delegates contested the Ward Congresses held on 16th May 2022 and lost, the onus was on the respondents to adduce evidence to show who were the eligible delegates who voted at the primary. He submitted that by Article 4.51 of INEC’s Regulations and Guidelines for the Political Primaries, Exhibit FAA 4, a political party who intends to organise its primaries by indirect method must provide to the commission, not later than 7 days to the primaries the list, of persons that will form the delegates for every elective position. He submitted that the provision raises a presumption that there must be a register of such delegates kept in the custody of the 3^rd respondent and that failure of the respondents to tender such register is a clear indication that the register did not exist. He submitted that the lower court wrongly placed the burden of producing the register on the appellant. He maintained that there was no accreditation on 27th May 2022 and that the lower court failed to take due cognisance of the documentary evidence tendered by the appellant to the

effect that only the 827 persons satisfied the laid down requirements for aspiring to be delegates.

He submitted that the acts of non-compliance with the Electoral Act 2022, APC Guidelines and INEC regulations highlighted and proved by the appellant constitute a serious violation and is sufficient to render the entire Gubernatorial Primary Election a nullity. See: APC Vs Karfi (2018) All FWLR (Pt. 942) 328 @ 371 – 372 H-A

Respondents’ Submissions

Learned counsel for the 1^st respondent submitted that where a party makes non-voting or disenfranchisement the pivot of his case, he must call evidence of at least one of the disenfranchised voters from each of the wards of the Jigawa State LGA’s as a witness to testify in support of his position, He referred to Kakih Vs PDP (2014) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1430) 374@ 419; Audu Vs INEC (No. 2) (2010) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1212) 436. He submitted that the appellant failed to produced evidence of the respective Voters/membership

cards of the 827 allegedly unopposed delegates, the result of the congress from which they emerged and the voters register. He submitted that mere purchase, completion and submission of the ‘delegate form as claimed by the appellant, does not automatically qualify that person as a delegate.

Learned counsel referred to Exhibits MDA1- MDA16, MDA1 IK – MDA22 IK attached to the appellant’s further affidavit to the 2^nd respondent’s counter affidavit as well as further affidavit to 1st respondent’s counter affidavit at pages 2960 – 3044 and 3070 – 3154 of Vol. 2 of the record and submitted that the said exhibits are a direct affirmation that the congresses in fact held. He submitted that they constitute an admission against interest. He submitted Exhibits Jigawa 5 and Jigawa 6 series at pages 1386 -2408 of volume 3 of the record constitute proof that the appellant’s 827 persons did not emerge as delegates and that the lower court was right when it held that the appellant failed to prove that his delegates were not only unopposed but also prevented from voting.

He submitted that having regard to Exhibits APC 5B Jigawa 9 and FAA 37B and other affidavit and documentary evidence before the court, the lower court was right when it held that accreditation took place. He noted that Exhibits FAA 36 and FAA 37B are documents relied upon by the appellant and they categorically state that accreditation took place. He submitted that oral evidence or address of counsel cannot alter documentary evidence. He also maintained, relying on Awuse Vs Odili (2005) 15 NWLR (Pt.932) 416, that the production of the relevant voters’ register is essential to establish an allegation of lack of accreditation.

He rejected the appellant’s contention that there was no proper accreditation because accreditation did not stop at 12 noon, particularly as the appellant fully participated in the primary election and garnered 13 voters. He wondered how he came about the said votes if there was no accreditation.

Learned counsel or the 2^nd respondent argued that the onus was on the appellant who sought declaratory

reliefs to prove his entitlement thereto and that he is not entitled to rely on the weakness of the defence, if any. Reference was made to Anyaru Vs Mandilas Ltd. (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt.1043) 462 477-478 H-D

He submitted, in a similar vein as learned counsel for the 1^st respondent, that there was sufficient affidavit and documentary evidence before the court to show that there was accreditation and voting. He argued further that learned counsel for the appellant was inconsistent in his assertions, as in one breath, he contended that there was no delegate produced by special congress and at the same time claimed that he had 827 delegates. He submitted that such inconsistency is not worthy of being accorded any favourable decision of the court.

Learned counsel for the 3^rd respondent argued in tandem with the 1^st and 2^nd respondents and submitted that there was no duty on the 2d respondent to exhibit receipts evidencing the purchase of delegates nomination forms. He submitted that the duty of the respondents was to show that delegates, election was held and result declared. It was als0 contended that

having regard to the appellant’s pleading in paragraphs 39 and 40 of his supporting affidavit, he is only Complaining about the accreditation because his list of unopposed delegates was not used. He submitted that the appellant has failed to show that the concurrent findings are wrong.

RESOLUTION OF ISSUE 2

It is important to bear in mind the fact that by his concurrent Originating Summons, the appellant sought declaratory reliefs from the trial court and therefore had the burden of proving his entitlement to those reliefs. The position of the law is that where a party seeks a declaration from the court of a particular state of affairs, it is an equitable relief and will not he granted as a matter of course. It will also not be granted on the basis of admission by the adverse party or weakness of the defence, if any. The appellant must succeed entirely on the strength of his own case. The only exception is where the defence supports the plaintiff’s case. See: Akande Vs Adisa & Anor. (2012) 5 SC (Pt.1) 1; (2012)

LPELR-7807 (SC)@ 38-39 F- B: Coker Vs Ayoade (1966) NWLR 81; Anyaru Vs Mandilas Ltd. (2007) 10 NWLR (Pt1043) 462; Nyesom Vs Peterside (2016) LPELR- 40036 (SC) @ 82 B- D.

Learned respective counsel for the respondents were therefore correct in their submissions that the burden of proof lay squarely on the appellant.

Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the lower court misconstrued his case as regards the 827 “unopposed” delegates. I had earlier reproduced some paragraphs of the supporting affidavit. Paragraph 27 (iii) bears repeating here:

2 (iii) The respective aspirants for the post of State Delegates went to the designated venues for the conduct of the State Delegates election between the period of am to 10pm on both days but the Delegates Election did not hold and the officials of 2^nd Defendant who were appointed to superintend the election did not show up, which made all the 82 Delegates to win unopposed.

The words are clear and unequivocal. Learned counsel cannot use his written address to assert

otherwise. It was the appellant’s contention that these 827 unopposed delegates were not allowed to vote and that had they participated, he would have won the primaries (paragraph 40 of the supporting affidavit). This is actually the crux of the appellant’s complaint. The learned trial Judge, at pages 3311 to 3312 of volume 5 of the record, held inter alia

“…the question is whether the 827 persons referenced by the plaintiff emerged unopposed and entitled to vote at the Primary Election. Exhibit FAA 5, which is the Notice of Conduct of special Congress states the business of the Congress “to elect LGA and State Delegates” and “to elect National Delegates. ” This is quite dear, if the congresses did not hold, not a soul can lay claim to the status of delegate however deep such person has taken steps to becoming one. I have to agree with the 1^st Defendant that by purchasing completing and submitting the delegates election form does not automatically ascribe the status of delegates on a person

Articles 22(ii) (supra) is to the effect that it is only the five elected state delegates that shall vote through secret ballot at the designated venue and the aspirant with the highest votes shall be declared the winner. it is the Defendants who have shown before this court that five delegates emerged from each Ward and it is

these delegates who voted in the primary election which produced the 1^st Defendant as the winner. How can this be faulted? The basis of the Plaintiff’s claim… is not supported by superior evidence, is not persuasive and is accordingly discountenanced.”

As rightly observed by the two lower courts and as submitted on behalf of the respondents before this court, there was counter documentary evidence tendered by the respondents vide Exhibits Jigawa 5 and Jigawa 6 series to show that other party members also bought their delegates forms, and were duly elected. The appellant therefore failed to discharge the burden on him to prove that his 827 delegates were the only ones who bought delegate forms and fulfilled necessary requirements. He also failed to prove that the congresses did not hold, which therefore left his claim that there were no eligible delegates to vote, without any support. The concurrent findings of the two lower courts in this regard are unassailable.

On the contention of lack of accreditation, the law is trite that the best form of evidence of non-accreditation and/or over voting is the voters’ register. See Nyesom

Vs Peterside (2016) 17 NWLR (Pt.1512) 452 456 A-CË The onus was on the appellant to produce same to substantiate his claim. Beyond this, the appellant who alleged that there was no accreditation, relied on Exhibits FAA 36 and FAA 37B to prove that the election was postponed from 26th to 27th May 2022. In the same exhibits it is clearly stated that:

“the primaries commenced with the accreditation of the delegates drawn from the 27 LGAs of the State. The elections started though roll call, ticking of the register and issuance of identification tags to the cleared delegates.”

These exhibits contradict the appellant’s stand that there was no accreditation. Moreover, not a single one of the alleged 827 disenfranchised delegates was called to testify.

It is my considered view that the two lower courts properly analysed and evaluated the evidence before them and came to the right conclusion that the appellant failed to prove his entitlement to the declaratory reliefs

sought. This issue is accordingly resolved against the appellant.

In conclusion, I hold that this appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. The parties shall bear their respective costs in the appeal.

CROSS APPEALS

Having resolved the main appeal against the appellant, the cross appeals challenging the appellant’s locus standi to institute the action at the trial court have become academic and are hereby struck out.

Appeal dismissed. The respective Cross Appeals of 1^st and 2^nd Respondents/Cross Appellants are struck out.

KUDIRAT MOTONMORI OLATOKUNBO KEKERE-EKUN

JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF NIGERIA

JUDGMENT (DELIVERED BY UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI, JSC) I have been availed a copy of the draft judgment by my learned brother, Kudirat Motonmori Olatokunbo Kekere-Ekun, JSC. The judgment written is detailed enough with faultless judicial reasoning and conclusion. I have not seen anything to add save to commend what my learmed brother has done and to concur that the conclusion is agreed to.

Appeal dismissed and parties are to bear their own costs. The cross-appeals are hereby struck out.

UWANI MUSA ABBA AJI,

JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT

77 (1)

JUDGMENT (Delivered by MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, JSC) I have read a draft copy of the lead Judgment written by my Learned Brother, K M. O. Kekere-Ekun, JSC n this appeal and agree, that the appeal is devoid of merit, deserving of dismissal.

78 (1)

As usual, may Learned Brother has meticulously considered and eruditely resolved the crucial issues that call for determination in the appeal in an admirably succinct and comprehensive manner. completely adopt the views expressed and the reasons for the conclusions in the Lead Judgment and join in dismissing the appeal in terms thereof.

MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA

JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT

79 (2)

JUDGMENT (DELIVERED BY IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA, JSC) I concur with the reasoning expressed in the judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Kekere-Ekun, JSC, to the conclusive effect that the instant appeal is grossly unmeritorious thus ought to be dismissed.

Hence, I too hereby dismiss the appeal for lacking in merits.

CROSS APPEALS

80 (1)

I equally agree with the reasoning, to the conclusive effect that having dismissed the main appeal (SC/CV/1453/2022). the cross appeals have become rather academic thus ought to be struck out

Accordingly, the respective cross appeals of the 1^st and 2^nd Respondents/Cross Appellants are hereby struck out.

IBRAHIM MOHAMMED MUSA SAULAWA

JUSTICE SUPREME COURT

81 (2)

JUDGMENT (DELIVERED BY ADAMU JAURO, JSC) I read before now a copy of the lead judgment delivered by my learned brother, Kudirat Motonmori Olatokunbo Kekere-Ekun, JSC. I agree with the reasoning and conclusion contained therein, to the effect that the appeal lacks merit.

82 (1)

I join my learned brother in dismissing the appeal and striking out the cross-appeals. Parties shall bear their respective costs.

ADAMU JAURO

JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT

APPEARANCES:-

ONYECHI IKPEAZU, SAN, PROF. NASIRU ADAMU ALIYU, SAN, ABDUL MOHAMMED, SAN, SUNUSI MUSA, SAN, for the Appellant/Cross-Respondent; with them, O.F. AMEDU, ESQ. PRINCE L.O. FAGBEMI, SAN; with him, K.O. FAGBEMI, ESQ, O.

POPOOLA, ESQ, B. OYUN, ESQ and T. OJO, ESQ for the 1^st Respondent/Cross Appellant.

Y.C. MAIKYAUU SAN, Y.A.H. RUBA, SAN for the 2^nd Respondent/Cross Appellant; with them, T.R. AGBANYI, ESQ and LABIRU AHMED, ESQ

DR. HASSAN M. LIMAN, SAN for the 3^rd Respondent/Cross Respondent; with him, SARAFA YUSUF, ESQ, AMANZI F.

AMANZI, ESQ, SADIQ EL-YAKUB IBRAHIM, ESQ and UMAR USMAN KOLOS, ESQ.

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